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Abstract
This paper presents the first polynomial-time algorithm for position and matroid auction
environments that learns, from samples from an unknown bounded valuation distribution, an
auction with expected revenue arbitrarily close to the maximum possible. In contrast to most
previous work, our results apply to arbitrary (not necessarily regular) distributions and the
strongest possible benchmark, the Myerson-optimal auction. Learning a near-optimal auction
for an irregular distribution is technically challenging because it requires learning the appropriate
“ironed intervals,” a delicate global property of the distribution.
1 Introduction
The traditional economic approach to revenue-maximizing auction design, exemplified by Myer-
son [27], posits a known prior distribution over what bidders are willing to pay, and then solves for
the auction that maximizes the seller’s expected revenue with respect to this distribution. Recently,
there has been an explosion of work in computer science that strives to make the classical theory
more “data-driven,” replacing the assumption of a known prior distribution with that of access
to relevant data, in the form of samples from an unknown distribution. In this paper, we study
the problem of learning a near-optimal auction from samples, adopting the formalism of Cole and
Roughgarden [9]. The idea of the model, inspired by PAC-learning [32], is to parameterize through
samples the “amount of knowledge” that the seller has about bidders’ valuation distributions.
We consider single-parameter settings, where each of n bidders has a private valuation (i.e.,
willingness to pay) for “winning” and valuation 0 for “losing.” Feasible outcomes correspond to
subsets of bidders that can simultaneously win; the feasible subsets are known in advance.1 We
assume that bidders’ valuations are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution F that is unknown to the seller.
However, we assume that the seller has access to m i.i.d. samples from the distribution F — for
example, bids that were observed in comparable auctions in the past. The goal is to design a
polynomial-time algorithm A(v1, . . . , vm) from samples vi ∼ F to truthful auctions that, for every
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correspond to subsets of at most k bidders.
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distribution F , achieves expected revenue at least 1−  times the optimal expected revenue.2 The
sample complexity of achieving a given approximation factor 1 −  is then the minimum number
of samples m such that there exists a learning algorithm A with the desired approximation. This
model serves as potential “sweet spot” between worst-case and average-case analysis, inheriting
much of the robustness of the worst-case model (since we demand guarantees for every underlying
distribution F ) while allowing very good approximation guarantees.
1.1 Our Results
We give polynomial-time algorithms for learning a (1 − )-approximate auction from samples, for
arbitrary matroid (or position) auction environments and arbitrary (not necessary regular) distri-
butions with bounded valuations. (See Section 2 for definitions.)
Precisely, our main result is a polynomial-time algorithm that, given a matroid environment
with n bidders and m i.i.d. samples from an arbitrary distribution F with maximum valuation H,
with probability 1−δ, approximates the maximum-possible expected revenue up to an additive loss
of at most 3n
√
ln 2δ−1
2m ·H. Thus for every  > 0, the additive loss is at most  (with probability at
least 1 − δ) provided m = Ω(n2H2−2 log δ−1). When valuations lie in [1, H], so that the optimal
expected revenue is bounded below, this result immediately implies the same sample complexity
bound for learning a (1−)-(multiplicative) approximate auction. Our main result can also be used
to give a no-regret guarantee in a stochastic learning setting (Section 5).
A lower bound of Cesa-Bianchi et al. [6] implies that, already for simpler settings, the quadratic
dependence of our sample complexity bound on 1 is optimal. A lower bound of Huang et al. [22]
implies that, already with a single bidder, the sample complexity must depend polynomially on H.
Whether or not the sample complexity needs to depend on n is an interesting open question.
Our approach is based on a “swiching trick” (Proposition 2.1) and we believe it will lead to
further applications. A key idea is to express the difference in expected revenue between an optimal
and a learned auction in a matroid or position environment purely in terms of a difference in area
under the true and estimated revenue curves. This “global” analysis avoids having to compare
explictly the true and estimated virtual valuations or the optimal and learned allocation rules.
With this approach, there is clear motivation behind each of the steps of the learning algorithm,
and the error analysis, while non-trivial, remains tractable in settings more general than those
studied in most previous works.
1.2 Why Irregular Distributions Are Interesting
A major difference between this paper and much previous work on learning near-optimal auctions
from samples is that our positive results accommodate irregular distributions. To explain, we first
note that learning a near-optimal auction from samples is impossible without some restriction on
the space of possible valuation distributions F .3 This observation motivates imposing the weakest-
possible conditions under which non-trivial positive results are possible.
2By a truthful auction, we mean one in which truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for every bidder. The
restriction to dominant strategies is natural given our assumption of an unknown distribution. Given this, the
restriction to truthful auctions is without loss of generality (by the “Revelation Principle,” see [29]). Also, for the
single-parameter problems that we study, there is a truthful optimal auction.
3To see this, consider a single-bidder problem and all distributions that take on a value M2 with probability 1
M
and 0 with probability 1 − 1
M
. The optimal auction for such a distribution earns expected revenue at least M . It
is not difficult to prove that, for every m, there is no way to use m samples to achieve near-optimal revenue for
2
A majority of the literature on approximation guarantees for revenue maximization (via learn-
ing algorithms or otherwise) restricts attention to “regular” valuation distributions or subclasses
thereof; see related work below for examples and exceptions. Formally, a distribution F with
density f is regular if
ϕ(v) = v − 1− F (v)
f(v)
(1)
is a nondecreasing function of v. ϕ is also called the virtual valuation function. Intuitively, regular-
ity is a logconcavity-type assumption that provides control over the tail of the distribution. While
many important distributions are regular, plenty of natural distributions are not. For example,
Sivan and Syrgkanis [31] point out that mixtures of distributions (even of uniform distributions)
tend to be irregular, and yet obviously occur in the real world. This motivates relaxing regularity
conditions while still somehow excluding pathological distributions. One interesting approach is
to parameterize a distribution by its “degree of irregularity;” see [20, 22, 31] for some proposals
of how to do this. Another approach, and the one we take here, is to bound the support of a
distribution (to [0, H] or [1, H], say) and allow it to be otherwise arbitrary. Bounded but other-
wise arbitrary valuation distributions clearly capture interesting settings beyond those modeled by
regular distributions.
1.3 Why Irregular Distributions Are Hard
To understand why irregular distributions (with bounded valuations) are so much more technically
challenging than regular distributions, we need to review some classical optimal auction theory. We
can illustrate the important points already in single-item auctions. Myerson [27] proved that, for
every regular distribution F , the optimal auction is simply a second-price auction supplemented
with a reserve price of ϕ−1(0), where ϕ denotes the virtual valuation function in (1). (The winner,
if any, pays the higher of the reserve price and the second-highest bid.) Thus, learning the optimal
auction reduces to learning the optimal reserve price, a single statistic of the unknown distribution.
And indeed, for an unknown regular distribution F , there is a polynomial-time learning algorithm
that needs only poly(1 ) samples to compute a (1− )-approximate auction [12, 22].
The technical challenge of irregular distributions is the need to iron. When the virtual valuation
function ϕ of the distribution F is not nondecreasing, Myerson [27] gave a recipe for transforming
ϕ into a nondecreasing “ironed” virtual valuation function ϕ such that the optimal single-item
auction awards the item to the bidder with the highest positive ironed virtual valuation (if any),
breaking ties randomly. Intuitively, this ironing procedure identifies intervals of non-monotonicity
in ϕ and changes the value of the function to be constant on each of these intervals. (See also below
and the exposition by Hartline [20].)
The point is that the appropriate ironing intervals of a distribution are a global property of
the distribution and its (unironed) virtual valuation function. Estimating the virtual valuation
function at a single point — all that is needed in the regular case — would appear much easier
than estimating the right intervals to iron in the irregular case.
We present two examples to drive this point home. The first, which is standard, shows that not
ironing can lead to a constant-factor loss in expected revenue. The second shows that tiny mistakes
every such distribution — for sufficiently large M , all m samples are 0 w.h.p. and the algorithm has to resort to an
uneducated guess for M .
3
in the choice of ironing intervals can lead to a large loss of expected revenue.4
Example 1.1 (Ironing Is Necessary for Near-Optimal Revenue) The distribution is as fol-
lows: with probability 1/H the value is H (for a large H) and it is 1 otherwise. The optimal auction
irons the interval [1, H) for expected revenue of 2− 1n [20], which approaches 2 with many bidders n.
Auctions that do not implicitly or explicitly iron obtain expected revenue only 1.
Example 1.2 (Small Mistakes Matter) Let F be 5 with probability 1/10 and 1 otherwise, and
consider a single-item auction with 10 bidders. The optimal auction irons the interval [1, 5) and
has no reserve price. If there are at least two bidders with value 5 one of them will get the item
at price 5; if all bidders have value 1, one of them will receive it at price 1. If there is exactly one
bidder with value 5, then her price is 110 · 1 + 910 · 5 = 4610 .
Now consider an algorithm that slightly overestimated the end of the ironing interval to be
[1, 5 + ) with  > 0. (Imagine F actually has small but non-zero density above 5, so that this
mistake could conceivably occur.) Now all bids always fall in the ironing interval and therefore
the item is always awarded to one of the players at price 1. Not only do we lose revenue when
there is exactly one bidder, but additionally we lose revenue for auctions with at least two bidders
with value 5. This auction has even worse revenue than the standard second-price auction, so the
attempt to iron did more harm than good.
If we adapt Example 1.2 to slightly underestimate the ironing interval, there is almost no loss in
revenue. This motivates an important idea in our learning algorithm, which is to closely protect
against overestimation.
1.4 Related Work
Elkind [16] gives a polynomial-time learning algorithm for the restricted case of single-item auctions
with discrete distributions with known finite supports but with unknown probabilities. In the model
in [16], learning is done using an oracle that compares the expected revenue of pairs of auctions,
and O(n2K2) oracles calls suffice to determine the optimal auction (where n is the number of
bidders and K is the support size of the distributions). Elkind [16] notes that such oracle calls
can be implemented approximately by sampling (with high probability), but no specific sample
complexity bounds are stated.
Cole and Roughgarden [9] also give a polynomial-time algorithm for learning a (1−)-approximate
auction for single-item auctions with possibly non-identical bidders, under incomparable assump-
tions to [16]: valuation distributions that can be unbounded but must be strongly regular. It is
necessary and sufficient to have m = poly(n, 1 ) samples, however in the analysis in [9] the exponent
in the upper bound is large (currently, 10).
The papers of Cesa-Bianchi et al. [5] and Medina and Mohri [25] give algorithms for learning
the optimal reserve-price-based single-item auction. Recall from Example 1.1 that, with irregular
distributions, the best reserve-price-based auction can have expected revenue far from optimal.
Dughmi et al. [13] proved negative results (exponential sample complexity) for learning near-
optimal mechanisms in multi-parameter settings that are much more complex than the single-
parameter settings studied here. The paper also contains positive results for restricted classes of
mechanisms.
4See Appendix A for a different example that demonstrates why irregular distributions are harder than regular
ones.
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Huang et al. [22] give optimal sample complexity bounds for the special case of a single bid-
der under several different distributional assumptions, including for the case of bounded irregular
distributions where they need O(H · −2 · log(H−1)) samples.
Morgenstern and Roughgarden [26] recently gave general sample complexity upper bounds which
are similar to ours and cover all single-parameter settings (matroid and otherwise), although the
(brute-force) learning algorithms in [26] are not computationally efficient.
For previously studied models about revenue-maximization with an unknown distribution, which
differ in various respects from the model of Cole and Roughgarden [9], see [2, 6, 23]. For other
ways to parameterize partial knowledge about valuations, see e.g. [1, 8]. For other uses of samples
in auction design that differ from ours, see Fu et al. [17], who use samples to extend the Cre´mer-
McLean theorem [10] to partially known valuation distributions, and Chawla et al. [7], which is
discussed further below. For asymptotic optimality results in various symmetric settings (single-
item auctions, digital goods), which identify conditions under which the expected revenue of some
auction of interest (e.g., second-price) approaches the optimal with an increasing number of i.i.d.
bidders, see Neeman [28], Segal [30], Baliga and Vohra [4], and Goldberg et al. [18]. For applications
of learning theory concepts to prior-free auction design in unlimited-supply settings, see Balcan et
al. [3].
Finally, the technical issue of ironing from samples comes up also in Ha and Hartline [19]
and Chawla et al. [7], in models incomparable to the one studied here. The setting of [19] is
constant-factor approximation guarantees for prior-free revenue maximization, where the goal is
input-by-input rather than distribution-by-distribution guarantees. Chawla et al. [7] study non-
truthful auctions, where bidders’ true valuations need to be inferred from equilibrium bids, and aim
to learn the optimal “rank-based auction,” which can have expected revenue a constant factor less
than that of an optimal auction. Our goal of obtaining a (1 − )-approximation of the maximum
revenue achieved by any auction is impossible in the settings of [19, 7].
Summarizing, this paper gives the first polynomial-time algorithm for position and matroid en-
vironments that learns, from samples from an unknown irregular valuation distribution, an auction
with expected revenue arbitrarily close to the maximum possible.
1.5 Organization
Section 2 covers learning and auction preliminaries important for our analysis. Section 3 presents
many of our key ideas in the special case of a single-item auction. Section 4 extends our results
to position and matroid auction environments. Section 5 deduces a no-regret guarantee from our
learning algorithms.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Empirical Cumulative Distribution Function and the DKW Inequality
Let X = {Xi}mi=1 be a set of m samples, and let X(i) be the ith order statistic. We use the stan-
dard notion of the empirical cumulative distribution function (empirical CDF): F̂m(v) =
1
m · |{Xi :
Xi ≤ v}|. The empirical CDF is an estimator for the quantile of a given value. The Dvoretzky-
Kiefer-Wolfowitz (DKW) inequality [14, 24] states that the difference between the empirical CDF
and the actual CDF decreases quickly in the number of samples. Let m,δ =
√
ln 2δ−1
2m , then
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(a) Revenue curve R(q) and the opti-
mal induced revenue curve R?(q).
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(b) Virtual value function ϕ(q) and the
induced virtual value function ϕ?(q).
Figure 1: The dashed gray line is the revenue curve R(q) and its derivative, the virtual value
function ϕ(q), for a irregular bimodal distribution. In black we have the curves ϕopt and Ropt
corresponding to the optimal ironing interval, and optimal reserve price for this distribution. This
example taken from [20, Chapter 3].
Pr
[
supv∈R
∣∣∣F (v)− F̂m(v)∣∣∣ ≤ m,δ] ≥ 1 − δ. So the largest error in the empirical CDF shrinks
as O(m−1/2). For our purposes we will not need the CDF F , but rather its inverse F−1. Define
F̂−1m (x) as X(max(1,dx·me)) for x ∈ [0, 1]. (For convenience, define F̂−1m (x) as 0 if x < 0 and H if
x > 1.) By definition, for all v ∈ [0, H]:
F̂−1m
(
F̂m(v)
)
≤ v ≤ F̂−1m
(
F̂m(v) +
1
m
)
. (2)
In the remainder of this paper, we will use F̂ , F̂−1, and  without explicitly referring to the number
of samples m and confidence parameter δ.
2.2 Optimal Auctions using the Revenue Curve
Revenue Curve and Quantile Space For a value v and a distribution F , we define the corre-
sponding quantile as 1 − F (v).5 The quantile of v corresponds to the sale probability for a single
bidder with valuation drawn from F as the posted price v. Note that higher values correspond
to lower quantiles. The revenue curve R for value distribution F is the curve, in quantile space,
that is defined as R(q) = q · F−1(1 − q), see the dashed curve in Figure 1a. Myerson [27] showed
that the ex ante expected revenue for a bidder is Eq∼U [0,1][−R(q) · y′(q)], where y is the interim
allocation function for the standard Vickrey auction (defined formally below). The derivative of
R is the virtual value function ϕ(.) — recall (1) — in quantile space, see Figure 1b. For regular
distributions the revenue curve is concave and the virtual value function non-increasing, but for
irregular distributions this is not the case.
Myerson [27] showed that for any non-concave revenue curve R, one can create an allocation
rule that will yield the same revenue as R’s convex hull CH(R). This procedure is called ironing,
and for each interval where R differs from CH(R), we take the virtual value to be slope of the
convex hull over this interval. This means the virtual values are constant, and hence any two bids
5This is for consistency with recent literature; “reversed quantile” might be a more accurate term.
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in that range are interchangeable, so the ironed allocation function is constant on this interval.6
The resulting ironed revenue curve R? will be concave and the corresponding ironed virtual value
function ϕ? will be monotonically non-increasing. It is also useful to think of a reserve price r (with
corresponding quantile qr) in a similar way, as effectively changing the virtual valuation function
so that ϕ?(q) = 0 whenever q ≥ qr (Figure 1b), with the corresponding revenue curve R? constant
in that region (Figure 1a).7
More generally, given any set of disjoint ironing intervals I and reserve price r, both in value
space, we can imagine these modifying the revenue curve as follows. (For now this is a thought
experiment; Proposition 2.1 connects these revenue curve modifications back to allocation rule
modifications.) Let R be the revenue curve without ironing or a reserve price, and define R(I,r) as
the revenue curve induced by a set I of ironing intervals and reserve price r. This curve is defined
by
R(I,r)(q) =

R(F (r)) if q > F (r)
R(qa) +
q−qa
qb−qa (R(qb)−R(qa)) if q ∈ (qa, qb] with [F−1(1− qb), F−1(1− qa)) ∈ I
R(q) otherwise.
(3)
Given I and r as above, we define the auction A(I,r) as follows: given a bid profile: (i) reject
every bid with bi < r; (ii) for each ironing interval [a, b) ∈ I, treat all bids {bj : a ≤ bj < b} as
identical (equal to some common number between a and b); (iii) among the remaining bidders,
maximize the social welfare (sum of the ironed bids of the winners); (iv) charge payments so that
losers always pay 0 and so that truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for every player. This
auction is well defined (i.e., independent of the choice of the common numbers in (ii)) in settings
where the computation in (iii) depends only on the ordering of the ironed bids, and not on their
numerical values. In this case, the payments in (iv) are uniquely defined (by standard mechanism
design results). This is the case in every matroid environment8 and also in position auctions
(see [15, 33]). In such a setting, we use A to denote the set of all auctions of the form A(I,r). We
restrict attention to such settings for the rest of the paper.
The Switching Trick Given a distribution F , we explained two ways to use ironing intervals I
and a reserve price r: (i) to define a modified revenue curve R(I,r) (and hence virtual valuations);
or (ii) to define an auction A(I,r). The “switching trick” formalizes the connection between them:
the expected virtual welfare of the welfare-maximizing auction with the modified virtual valuations
(corresponding to the derivative of R(I,r)) equals the expected virtual welfare of the modified
auction A(I,r) with the original virtual valuations.
More formally, let xi : Rn+ → R+ be the ex-post allocation function of the welfare maximizing
truthful auction that takes the bids b of all players and results in the allocation to bidder i. The
6It takes some effort to show that keeping the allocation probability constant on an interval has exactly the effect
we described here [27].
7Most of the existing literature would not consider the effect of the reserve price on the revenue curve, in which
case the black and dashed lines would coincide after the second peak. However, by including its effect as we did, we’ll
be able to apply the Switching Trick described below.
8In a matroid environment, the set F of feasible outcomes satisfies: (i) (downward-closed) T ∈ F and S ⊆ T
implies S ∈ F ; and (ii) (exchange property) whenever S, T ∈ I with |T | < |S|, there is some i ∈ S \ T such that
T ∪ {i} ∈ I.
7
interim allocation function yi : [0, 1]→ R+ is the expected allocation to bidder i when her quantile is
q, where the expectation is over the quantiles of the other bidders: yi(qi) = Eq−i∼U [0,1]n−1 [x(F
−1(1−
q), F−1(1 − q−i))] where F−1(1 − q−i) is b−i for which each bj = F (1 − qj). For example, in the
standard Vickrey (single-item) auction with n bidders, every bidder i has the interim allocation
function yi(q) = (1− q)n−1.9
For every auction of the form A(I,r), the interim allocation function y(I,r)i of a bidder i can be
expressed in terms of the interim allocation function yi without ironing and reserve price (see also
Figure 1b):
y
(I,r)
i (q) =

0 if q > F (r)
1
qb−qa
∫ qb
qa
y(q)dq if q ∈ [qa, qb) with [F−1(1− qb), F−1(1− qa)) ∈ I
yi(q) otherwise.
(4)
Proposition 2.1 (Switching Trick) Consider a matroid or position auction setting, as above.
For every valuation distribution F , every reserve price r, every set I of disjoint ironing intervals,
and every bidder i,
Eq∼U [0,1][R(q) · (y(I,r)i )′(q)] = Eq∼U [0,1][R(I,r)(q) · y′i(q)].
Proof: Fix F , I, r, and y. Let y(I,r) be the interim allocation rule from running auction AI,r. Let
R be the revenue curve of F and let R(I,r) denote the revenue curve induced by I and r.
• Define a distribution F (I,r) (which is not equal to F unless I = ∅ and r = 0) that has the
property that its revenue curve q · F (I,r)(1 − q) is R(I,r). To see that this is well-defined,
observe the following. Any line ` through the origin only intersects R(I,r) once (if there are
point masses in F then a line through the origin intersect R in a single interval). This means
that we can use R(I,r) to construct F (I,r): F (I,r)(v) is the q for which q · v intersects with
R(I,r)(q) (if there are any point masses then there will be a range of q for which this is the
case; in that case take the largest such q). Alternatively, see Hartline and Roughgarden [21]
for an explicit formula for F (I,r).
• If we run the same auction AI,r on bidders with values drawn from F (I,r), the expected
revenue is identical to the auction with bidder values drawn from F :
Eq∼U [0,1][R(q) ·
(
y(I,r)
)′
(q)] = Eq∼U [0,1][R(I,r)(q) ·
(
y(I,r)
)′
(q)].
This can easily be seen by filling in the definitions from (3) and (4).
• If the bidders have distribution F (I,r), then we might as well not iron or have a reserve price
at all; so
Eq∼U [0,1][R(I,r)(q) ·
(
y(I,r)
)′
(q)] = Eq∼U [0,1][R(I,r)(q) · y′(q)].
This is also easily seen by filling in the definitions.

9In general matroid settings, different bidders can have different interim allocation functions (even though valua-
tions are i.i.d.)
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Revenue Curve Description
R q · F−1(1− q)
R̂min q · F̂−1(1− q − )
R̂max q · F̂−1(1− q + + 1m)
Table 1: Overview of notation for revenue curves.
2.3 Notation
In the remainder of this paper, our analysis will rely on bounding the difference in revenue of an
auction with respect to the optimal auction in terms of their revenue curves. We will use the
following conventions, see Table 1. The unaltered revenue curve for distribution is denoted by
R(q) = q · F−1(1 − q). To denote when we use an estimator for a revenue, i.e. a revenue curve
that is constructed based on samples, we use a hat: R̂(q) = q · F̂−1(1− q). Based on the available
samples we construct high-probability upper and lower bounds for R, that are thus denoted as
R̂max(q) = q · F̂−1(1− q + + 1m) and R̂min(q) = q · F̂−1(1− q − ).
We use superscript to denote when a revenue curve is ironed and has a reserve price. For a
general set of ironing intervals I and reserve price r, R(I,r) is the revenue curve induced by it, see
(3). The superscript ? denotes that the revenue curve is optimally ironed and reserved, i.e. R? is
the revenue curve of Myerson’s auction using F , and R̂?max is the revenue curve corresponding to
the convex hull of R̂max that additionally stays constant after the highest point. Finally, we’ll use
Ralg and Ropt to denote an algorithm ALG’s revenue curve and the optimal revenue curve for F
respectively (thus Ropt = R?, but we’ll use Ropt to emphasize its relation to Ralg).
For the ironing intervals I (and reserve price r) we use Iq (resp. rq) when it is important that
the ironing intervals are defined in quantile space. Finally, Iopt, Ialg, and Imax (and similarly for
reserve r) refer to the ironing intervals of the optimal auction, algorithm ALG and the optimal
ironing intervals for R̂max respectively.
3 Additive Loss in Revenue for Single-Item Auctions
In this section we describe an algorithm that takes a set X of m samples, and a confidence parameter
δ as input, and outputs a set I of ironing intervals and a reserve price r, both in value space. We
focus on the case where I and r are used in a single-item auction AI,r(1) ∈ A (recall the notation
in Section 2) and show that the additive loss in revenue of AI,r(1) with respect to the revenue of the
optimal auction Aopt(1) for single-item auctions is O( · n · H), with  =
√
ln 2δ−1
2m . In section 4 we
extend the results to matroid and position auctions.
Theorem 3.1 (Main Theorem) For a single-parameter environment with optimal auction of the
form A(I,r) with n i.i.d. bidders with values from unknown irregular distribution F , m i.i.d. samples
from F , with probability 1− δ, the additive loss in expected revenue of Algorithm 2 compared to the
optimal expected revenue is at most 3 · n ·H ·
√
ln 2δ−1
2m .
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Algorithm 1 Compute the ironing intervals I and reserve price r.
ComputeAuction(X, δ)
1 Construct F̂−1 from X; let  =
√
ln 2·δ−1
2|X| .
2 Construct R̂min(q) = q · F̂−1(1− q − ).
3 Compute the convex hull CH(R̂min), of R̂min.
4 Let Iq be the set of intervals where R̂min and CH(R̂min) differ.
5 for each quantile ironing interval (ai, bi) ∈ Iq
6 Add [F̂−1(1− bi − ), F̂−1(1− ai − )) to I.
7 Let the reserve quantile be rq = arg maxq R̂min(q).
8 Let the reserve price be r = F̂−1(1− rq − ).
9 return (I, r)
Algorithm 2 Empirical Myerson.
EmpiricalMyerson(X, δ,b)
1 I, r ← ComputeAuction(X, δ)
2 return AI,r(1) (b)
3.1 The Empirical Myerson Auction
We run the Empirical Myerson auction (Algorithm 2), which we divided this into two parts: the
first is an algorithm ALG (Algorithm 1) that computes the ironing intervals I and reserve price r
based on samples X and confidence parameter δ. The second step is to run the welfare-maximizing
auction subject to ironing and reservation. In this section we focus on analyzing the single-item
auction, but the only place this is used is in line 2 of Algorithm 2. Auctions for position auctions
and matroid environments are defined completely analogously.
The Empirical Myerson auction takes an estimator for the quantile function F̂−1 and constructs
its revenue curve.10 From this, the convex hull CH(R) is computed and wherever CH(R) and R
disagree, an ironing interval is placed. Then, the highest point on R is used to obtain the reserve
price quantile qr = arg maxq R(q). Note that this is all done in quantile space, but we need to
specify the reserve price and ironing intervals in value space. So the last step is to use the empirical
CDF F̂ to obtain the values at which to place the reserve price and ironing intervals.
Algorithm 2 follows that approach, with the exception that in line 2 of ComputeAuction, we
take the empirical quantile function to be F̂−1(1 − q − ) rather than the arguably more natural
choice of F̂−1(1− q). By the DKW inequality, F̂−1(1− q − ) ≤ F−1(1− q) with probability 1− δ
(we prove this in Lemma 3.3). The motivation here is to protect against overestimation — recall
10There are variations that differ from this approach, most notably the Random Sampling Empirical Myerson
(RSEM) [11] which constructs the revenue curve from the bidders in the auction, rather than from past data. This
leads to constant-factor approximation bounds for prior-free auctions.
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the cautionary tale of Example 1.2. That this approach indeed leads to good revenue guarantees
is shown in this section.
3.2 Additive Revenue Loss in Terms of Revenue Curves
We start with a technical lemma that reduces bounding the loss in revenue to bounding the esti-
mation error due to using samples as opposed to the true distribution F .
Lemma 3.2 For a distribution F , let Ralg be the revenue curve induced by an algorithm ALG ∈ A
and let Ropt be the optimal induced revenue curve. The additive revenue loss of ALG with respect
to OPT is at most:
n · max
q∈[0,1]
(
Ropt(q)−Ralg(q)
)
.
Proof: First, to calculate the ex ante expected revenue of a bidder i with revenue curve R, ironing
intervals I and reserve price r, we have by Myerson [27]:
Rev[R, I, r] = −Eq∼U [0,1][R(q) · (y(I,r))′(q)]. (5)
Next, we apply the Switching Trick of Proposition 2.1. Let Ialg, Iopt be the sets of ironing intervals
and ralg, ropt be the reserve prices of ALG and OPT respectively. This yields total revenues:
Rev[F, Ialg, ralg]
n
= −
∫ 1
0
Ralg(q)y′(q)dq,
Rev[F, Iopt, ropt]
n
= −
∫ 1
0
Ropt(q)y′(q)dq.
Note that the interim allocation function y in both cases is the same one; the only difference between
y(Iopt,ropt) and y(Ialg ,ralg) was the ironing intervals and reserve price, so after applying the switching
trick, y is simply the truthful welfare-maximizing interim allocation rule (for single-item auctions
this is the probability for bidder i to have the largest value vi = maxj vj). This is the key point in
our analysis, and it allows us to compare the expected revenue of both auctions directly:
Rev[F, Iopt, ropt]−Rev[F, Ialg, ralg] = n
(
−
∫ 1
0
Ropt(q)y′(q)dq +
∫ 1
0
Ralg(q)y′(q)dq
)
= n
∫ 1
0
(
Ropt(q)−Ralg(q)
) (−y′(q)) dq
≤ n · max
q∈[0,1]
(
Ropt(q)−Ralg(q)
)
·
∫ 1
0
−y′(q)dq
= n · max
q∈[0,1]
(
Ropt(q)−Ralg(q)
)
· (−y(1) + y(0))
= n · max
q∈[0,1]
(
Ropt(q)−Ralg(q)
)
.
The inequality holds as −y′ is non-negative. The last equality holds as the probability of winning
when your quantile is 0 is y(0) = 1, and the probability of winning when your quantile is 1 is
y(1) = 0. Rearranging the terms yields the claim. 
This is significant progress: the additive loss in revenue can be bounded in terms of the induced
revenue curves of an algorithm ALG and the optimal algorithm, two objects that we have some hope
of getting a handle on. Of course, we still need to show that the ironed revenue curve of Algorithm 2
is pointwise close to the ironed revenue curve induced by the optimal auction (Section 3.3).
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R̂max = q · F̂−1(1− q + + 1m )
R(q) = q · F−1(1− q)
R̂min(q) = q · F̂−1(1− q − )R(q)
q10
Figure 2: We can sandwich R between two estimated revenue curves R̂min and R̂max.
3.3 Bounding the Error in the Revenue Curve
We implement the following steps to prove that the error in the learning algorithm’s estimation of
the revenue curve is small.
• (Lemma 3.3) We show that we can sandwich the actual revenue curve (without ironing or
reserve price) R between two empirical revenue curves, R̂min and R̂max that are defined using
the empirical quantile function.
• (Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.5) Let R̂?max (resp. R̂?min) be the optimally induced revenue curve
for R̂max (resp. R̂min). The revenue curve induced by Algorithm 2, R
alg, is pointwise higher
than the optimal induced revenue curve of the lower bound R̂?min, and the optimal induced
revenue curve for the upper bound, R̂?max, is pointwise higher than R
opt.
• (Lemma 3.6) Finally, we show that R̂?max(q) − R̂?min(q) is small for all q, and therefore the
additive loss is small.
Lemma 3.3 Let R̂min(q) = q · F̂−1(1−q−) and R̂max(q) = q · F̂−1(1−q++ 1m). With probability
at least 1− δ for all q ∈ [0, 1]:
R̂min(q) ≤ R(q) ≤ R̂max(q).
Proof: See Figure 2 for graphical intuition. We will start with the first inequality: R̂min(q) ≤ R(q).
By the DKW inequality with probability 1− δ the following holds for all v:
− ≤ F̂ (v)− F (v) ≤  (6)
Define q′ = F (v). We can rewrite the first inequality of (6):
q′ −  ≤ F̂ (v)
F̂−1
(
q′ − ) ≤ F̂−1 (F̂ (v))
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Since F̂−1 is mononotonically non-decreasing. We now invoke (2):
F̂−1
(
q′ − ) ≤ F̂−1 (F̂ (v)) ≤ v = F−1(q′).
Now let q = 1− q′, and multiply both sides by q to obtain: R̂min(q) ≤ R(q).
The proof for the upper bound of R is analogous with the exception that we pick up another
1
m term to invoke (2). 
So while the the algorithm does not know the exact revenue curve R, it can be upper bounded
by R̂max and lower bounded by R̂min. We’ll use R̂min to give a lower bound on the revenue curve
Ralg induced by Algorithm 2, and R̂max to give an upper bound on the revenue curve R
opt induced
by Myerson’s optimal auction. We start with the latter.
Lemma 3.4 Let Ropt be the optimal induced revenue curve of R, and let R̂?max be the optimal
induced revenue curve for R̂max. Then with probability 1− δ for all q ∈ [0, 1]:
Ropt(q) ≤ R̂?max(q).
Proof: By Lemma 3.3 we know that for every q, R̂max(q) ≥ R(q). First take the effect of optimally
ironing both curves into account. Optimal ironing will lead to induced revenue curves CH(R̂max)
and CH(R) and since R̂max is pointwise higher, so is its convex hull. What remains to be proven
is that this property is maintained after the effect of the reserve price of the curve. The reserve
quantile is the highest point on the curve, and the induced revenue curve will stay constant for all
higher quantiles. Let q be the reserve quantile for R. If the reserve quantile for R̂max happens to
be the same, then the statement is proven. Moreover, if the optimal reserve quantile for R̂max is
not q, it can only be higher, in which case the statement is also proven. 
So R̂?max is pointwise higher than R
opt. Proving that R̂?min is a lower bound for R
alg is slightly
more involved since the ironing intervals and reserve price are given by Algorithm 2, and may not
be optimal. Therefore, the induced revenue curve Ralg is in general not concave, and the reserve
quantile may not be at the highest point of the curve. However, since Ralg is induced by the
reserve price and ironing intervals that were chosen by looking at R̂min, there is enough structural
information to prove the lower bound.
Lemma 3.5 Let Ralg be the revenue curve induced by Algorithm 2 and let R̂?min be the optimal
induced revenue curve for R̂min. Then with probability 1− δ for all q ∈ [0, 1]:
R̂?min(q) ≤ Ralg(q).
Proof: Again we first argue that after ironing the induced curve R̂?min is completely below R
alg,
and subsequently show that this is still true after setting the reserve price.
Algorithm 2 picks the ironing intervals based on where R̂?min differs from CH(R̂min). However,
R̂min and R
alg are defined in quantile space, whereas the ironing intervals are defined in value
space. This means that Ralg is not necessarily ironed on the same intervals in quantile space as
R̂?min. The line that goes through the origin and intersects R̂min at q, will intersect R at the point
q′ where the F−1(q′) = F̂−1(1− q − ), see Figure 3.11 Any line through the origin intersects R̂min
11It’s important to note that we do not need to know F−1, to predict the effect of ironing the actual revenue curve.
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R(q) = q · F−1(1− q)
R̂min(q) = q · F̂−1(1− q − )
R(q)
q10
Figure 3: When we pick a value range to iron based on R̂min, its effect on the actual revenue curve
can be seen. The quantiles of the start and end point of the ironing procedure are given by the line
that intersects the start and end point on R̂min and the origin.
before it intersects R, and since ironing is done according to these lines through the origin, this
property is maintained after ironing. The reserve price is determined in the same way, and hence
Ralg(q) ≥ R̂?min(q) for all q ∈ [0, 1] as claimed. 
So we have our upper bound and lower bounds in terms of F̂−1. Finally we show that the
difference between the two is small.
Lemma 3.6 For a distribution F , let Ralg be the revenue curve induced by Algorithm 2, Ropt be the
optimal induced revenue curve. Using m samples from F , with probability 1− δ and  =
√
ln 2·δ−1
2m
for all q:
Ropt(q)−Ralg(q) ≤ R̂?max(q)− R̂?min(q) ≤
(
2+
1
m
)
H ≤ 3 ·H.
Proof: Let Imax and rmax be the set of ironing intervals and reserve price in quantile space of R̂?max.
Comparing R̂?max and R̂
?
min directly is difficult since the ironing intervals and reserve price may be
quite different between the two. Instead, we will take the set Imax of ironing intervals [ai, bi), and
reserve quantile rmax from R̂
?
max and use this to iron R̂min(q) at intervals [ai− 2− 1m , bi− 2− 1m),
and set a reserve price of rmax − 2− 1m .
If we compare R̂?max against this induced curve R̂
(Imax,rmax)
min , we have an upper bound for the
difference with respect to R̂?min, since the latter is the optimal induced revenue curve and therefore
pointwise higher. We can reason about ironing in quantile space without loss of generality since
both R̂max and R̂min use the same function F̂−1 (alternatively think of it as ironing in value space
based on R̂max, the line through the origin and R̂max(q) intersects R̂min at q − 2− 1m).
There are 3 cases to handle: 1) if q falls in an ironing interval [ai, bi) ∈ Imax, 2) if the quantile
q is higher than the reserve quantile q ≥ rmax of R̂max, and 3) when neither of those cases apply.
We start with the case for a q where R̂?max(q) = R̂max, i.e. q does not fall in an ironing interval and
is smaller than the reserve quantile:
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R̂?max(q) = q · F̂−1
(
1− q + + 1
m
)
≤
(
q − 2− 1
m
)
· F̂−1
(
1− q + + 1
m
)
+
(
2+
1
m
)
H
= R̂min
(
q − 2− 1
m
)
+
(
2+
1
m
)
H
= R̂?min
(
q − 2− 1
m
)
+
(
2+
1
m
)
H
≤ R̂?min(q) +
(
2+
1
m
)
H
where the first inequality holds because F̂−1(q) ≤ H for all q and the last inequality follows because
R̂?min is monotonically non-decreasing. Rearranging yields the claim for q not in an ironing interval
or reserved.
The other cases follow similarly: consider the case where q ≥ rmax.
R̂?max(q) = R̂max (rmax)
= rmax · F̂−1
(
1− rmax + + 1
m
)
≤
(
rmax − 2− 1
m
)
· F̂−1
(
1− rmax + + 1
m
)
+
(
2+
1
m
)
H
= R̂min
(
rmax − 2− 1
m
)
+
(
2+
1
m
)
H
≤ R̂?min
(
rmax − 2− 1
m
)
+
(
2+
1
m
)
H
≤ R̂?min (q) +
(
2+
1
m
)
H
where the last inequality holds because rmax − 2− 1m ≤ rmax ≤ q and R̂?min is non-decreasing.
Finally the case for when q falls in an ironing interval is analogous: R̂?max(q) is a convex combi-
nation of the end points of the ironing interval: R̂?max(q) =
q−ai
bi−ai · R̂max(ai) +
(
1− q−aibi−ai
)
R̂max(bi)
and hence
R̂?min(q) ≥
q − ai
bi − ai · R̂min
(
ai − 2− 1
m
)
+
(
1− q − ai
bi − ai
)
R̂min
(
bi − 2− 1
m
)
+
(
2+
1
m
)
H.
And so R̂?max(q)− R̂?min(q) ≤
(
2+ 1m
)
H in all cases. 
Theorem 3.1 now follows by combining Lemmas 3.2 and 3.6. The additive loss the in expected
revenue of Algorithm 2 is at most 3 · n ·H.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: By Lemma 3.2 we can express the total additive error of the expected
revenue of an algorithm that yields ironing intervals Ialg and reserve price ralg with respect to the
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optimal auction as:
Rev[F, Iopt, ropt]−Rev[F, Ialg, ralg]
n
≤ max
q∈[0,1]
(
Ropt(q)−Ralg(q)
)
.
By Lemma 3.6, Algorithm 2 yields
max
q∈[0,1]
(
Ropt(q)−Ralg(q)
)
≤
(
2+
1
m
)
H.
The theorem follows. 
When valuations lie in [1, H], so that the optimal expected revenue is bounded below, these
results easily imply a sample complexity upper bound O
(
−2 ln −1n2H2
)
for learning (efficiently)
a (1− )-(multiplicative) approximate auction.
In Section 4 we show how to extend these results from single-item auctions to matroid environ-
ments and position environments.
4 Matroid and Position Environments
In Lemma 3.2 we showed that for environments with optimal auctions in AI,r, the additive loss of
Algorithm 2 can be bounded in terms of the error in estimating the ironed revenue curve.
In this section we show that Myerson’s optimal auction can be expressed in this way for more
general single-parameter environments with i.i.d. bidders as well: namely in position auctions and
auctions with matroid constraints. The theorem statement is as follows; the proof follows from
Fact 4.2 and Fact 4.3 that show that the optimal auctions for those environments are in A (i.e.,
have the form A(I,r) for a suitable choice of ironed intervals I and reserve price r).
Theorem 4.1 For position and matroid auctions with n i.i.d. bidders with values from unknown
distribution F , m i.i.d. samples from F , with probability 1− δ, the additive loss in expected revenue
of Algorithm 2 compared to the optimal expected revenue is at most 3 · n ·H ·
√
ln 2δ−1
2m .
Our results stand in contrast to previous work on picking the optimal reserve price based on
samples, for which a Ω( lognlog logn) lower bound is known in these settings [11].
4.1 Position Auctions
A position auction [33] is one where the winners are given a position, and position i comes with a
certain quantity xi of the good. The canonical example is that of ad slot auctions for sponsored
search, where the best slot has the highest click-through-rate, and subsequent slots have lower and
lower click-through-rates. In an optimal auction, the bidder with the highest ironed virtual value
gets the best slot, the second highest ironed virtual value the second slot, and so on.
Fact 4.2 The optimal auction Aopt(pos) for position auctions can be expressed as an auction with
ironing and reserve price in value space: Aopt(pos) ∈ A.
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Proof: In the optimal auction, the bidder with the highest ironed virtual value is awarded the first
position (with allocation x1), the bidder with the second highest ironed virtual value the second
position with x2, and so on. Since the ironed virtual value are monotonically non-decreasing in
the value of a bidder, and identical in ironing intervals, this can equivalently be described by an
auction in A. 
4.2 Matroid Environments
In a matroid environment, the feasible allocations are given by matroid M = (E, I), where E are
the players and I are independent sets. The auction can simultaneously serve only sets S of players
that form an independent set of the matroid S ∈ I. A special case of this is the rank k uniform
matroid, which accepts all subsets of size at most k, i.e. it is a k-unit auction environment.
In matroid environments, the ex-post allocation function xi(b) and interim allocation function
yi(q) are no longer the same for each player, e.g. imagine a player i who is not part of any
independent set, then y(q) = 0 everywhere. So for matroid environments, the total additive loss is
Rev[F, Iopt, ropt]−Rev[F, Ialg, ralg] =
n∑
i=1
(
−
∫ 1
0
Ropt(q)y′i(q)dq +
∫ 1
0
Ralg(q)y′i(q)dq
)
= ...
= n · max
q∈[0,1]
(
Ropt(q)−Ralg(q)
)
.
We need to show that the optimal allocation can still be expressed in terms of an auction A ∈ A.
Fact 4.3 The optimal auction Aopt(mat) for matroid auctions can be expressed as an auction with
ironing and reserve price in value space: Aopt(pos) ∈ A.
Proof of Fact 4.3: A property of matroids is that the following simple greedy algorithm yields the
optimal solution:
Greedy(E, I)
1 S ← ∅
2 while {i : i 6∈ S ∧ S ∪ {i} ∈ I} 6= ∅
3 S ← arg max{vi : i 6∈ S ∧ S ∪ {i} ∈ I}
4 return S
where vi is the (ironed virtual) value associated with bidder i. Since the order of largest values
is the same for both virtual values and bids (up to ties), the allocation of the optimal auction is
identical to the auction that irons on Iopt and has reserve price ropt (up to tie-braking); hence
Aopt(mat) ∈ A. 
5 No-Regret Algorithm
So far we assumed access to batch of samples before having to choose an auction. In this section
we show that even if we start out without any samples, but run the auction is a repeated setting,
using past bids as samples leads to a no-regret algorithm. The goal here is to achieve additive error
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Algorithm 3 A no-regret algorithm for optimal auctions.
No-Regret-Auction(δ, T )
1 B Round 0:
2 Collect a set of bids b, run VCG(b)
3 X ← b
4 for round t = 1...T
5 Collect a set of bids b
6 EmpiricalMyerson(X, δ/T,b)
7 X ← X ∪ b
o(T ) · O(poly(n,H, δ)) — the error can be polynomial in all parameters except the time horizon
T , for which it should be strictly sublinear. We show that for Algorithm 3 the total loss grows as
O˜(
√
T
√
n
√
log(δ−1)H) and hence results in a no-regret algorithm.
Invoking Theorem 3.1 with confidence parameter δ/T and taking a union bound, we have the
following.
Fact 5.1 With probability 1−δ, for all rounds simultaneously, each round t ∈ [1, T ] of Algorithm 3
has additive loss at most 3
√
ln(2Tδ−1)
2nt · n ·H.
This leads to the following no-regret bound.
Theorem 5.2 With probability 1−δ, the total additive loss of Algorithm 3 is O(√n√T log T
√
log δ−1·
H), which is O˜(T 1/2) with respect to T .
Proof: By Fact 5.1 with probability 1− δ for all rounds simultaneously, the additive loss for round
t is bounded by 3
√
ln(2Tδ−1)
2nt · n ·H. The loss of day 0 is at most H · n. The total loss can then be
bounded by:
(n ·H) ·
(
1 + 3
T∑
t=1
√
ln(2Tδ−1)
2nt
)
We can rewrite the sum:
T∑
t=1
√
ln(2T/δ)
2nt
=
√
ln(2T/δ)
2n
·
T∑
t=1
√
1
t
≤
√
ln(2T/δ)
2n
· 2
√
T
=
√
2T ln(2T/δ)
n
Hence the total loss is
(n ·H) ·
(
1 + 3
√
2T ln(4T/δ)
n
)
= O(
√
n
√
T log T
√
log δ−1 ·H);
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the dependence on T is O(
√
T log T ) = O˜(
√
T ). 
The bound of O(
√
T log T ) is almost tight, as there is a lower bound of Ω(
√
T ) given by [6].
Also note that if we do not know T a priori, we can use a standard doubling argument to obtain
the same asymptotic guarantee.
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A Reduced Information Model
This appendix considers a reduced information model for i.i.d. bidders where the auctioneer can
only set a reserve price and then observes the selling price; see also [6]. The goal is to model
an observer who can see the outcome of past auctions, and perhaps submit a “shill bid” to set a
reserve, but cannot directly observe the bids.
We assume we observe m samples from the second highest order statistic (so out of n i.i.d. bids,
we see the second highest bid). We show that there are distributions such that, in order to get the
performance close to that of running Myerson in the reduced information model, you first need to
see at least an exponential number of samples. This is far more than what would be needed with
regular valuation distributions, where only the monopoly price is relevant.
A.1 Lower Bound
Theorem A.1 For any  > 0, to obtain 14 −  additive loss compared to Myerson’s auction, with
constant probability you need Ω(2n/n) samples from F(2).
Before proving the statement, let’s think about what this means: it means that if all we observe
are samples from F(2), for large n, we cannot hope to get a vanishing regret in a polynomial (in n)
number of steps. Moreover, on this distribution, Myerson obtains at most 2 expected revenue, so
we lose 18 of the profit (see corollary after the proof).
Proof of Theorem A.1: We’ll give 2 distributions, D1 and D2, such that we need Ω(2
n) samples from
F(2) to differentiate between the two. Moreover, we’ll show that every auction that approximates
the optimal auction for either D1 or D2, incurs an additive loss of at least
1
2(1− 1√2) on one of the
two.
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(a) Two distributions, D1 and D2 that are hard to
distinguish using samples from F(2). The distribu-
tions agree on q ∈ [0, 1/2] and disagree elsewhere.
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(b) Consider ironing on [c,H). The top shaded area
indicates the loss with respect to D1 and the bottom
shaded area represents the loss with respect to D2.
Figure 4: Lower bound example for optimal auctions using samples from F(2).
We define D1 and D2 by their quantile function:
D−11 (q) =
{
H for q ≤ 1H
2 otherwise
D−12 (q) =

H for q ≤ 1H
2 for 1H < q ≤ 12
1 + 12q otherwise.
Here H  n is a sufficiently large constant. The two distributions agree on q ∈ [0, 12 ]. For
q ∈ (12 , 1] they differ, and the effect on the revenue curve can be seen in Figure 4a.
To complete the proof we need to show 2 things: 1) that differentiating between D1 and D2
based on samples from F(2) requires Ω(2
n/2) samples, and 2) that no auction can simultaneously
approximate the optimal solution for both.
The first aspect of this is straightforward. Whenever we observe a sample from F(2) from the
top half quantile: q ∈ [0, 12 ], we get no information, since this is the same for both distributions.
So a necessary condition for differentiating between D1 and D2 is if we observe a sample from
q ∈ (12 , 1]. For this to happen, we need that out of n draws, n−1 draws are in the bottom quantile.
This happens with probability n
2n−1 , so after
2n
n samples, with probability approximately 1− 1e we
haven’t seen a sample that will differentiate the two distributions.
Now we will show that until the moment when you can differentiate between D1 and D2, there
is no way to run an auction that performs well for both. Note that the optimal auction for D1 is
to iron [2, H) and the optimal auction for D2 is to iron [
3
2 , H). Neither has a reserve price. The
set of all auctions that could potentially work well for either, is the set of auctions that irons [c,H)
(see Figure 4b).
We’ll only count the loss we incur in the range [0, 12 ], take H → ∞ and we see that if a is the
height of the shaded region (of D1 resp. D2) at q =
1
2 , then its loss with respect to the optimal
auction is:
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n ·
∫ 1
2
0
2aq · (n− 1)(1− q)n−2dq = [2anq(1− q)n−1]1/2
0
− 2an
∫ 1
2
0
(1− q)n−1dq
= 2an
(
1
2
)n−1
− 2an
[
1
n
(1− q)n
]1/2
0
= 2an
(
1
2
)n−1
− 2an 1
n
(
1
2
)n
+ 2an
1
n
= 2an
(
1
2
)n−1(
1− 1
2n
)
+ 2a
≥ 2a
This means, that if we can show that for all choices of c ∈ [3/2, 1] at least one of D1, D2 has a
large a, we are done. The closer c is to 2, the smaller aD2 is, the closer c is to 3/2, the smaller aD1 ,
so we’ll balance the two and show that neither is small enough.
Finding aD1 in terms of c is easy enough: aD1 =
2−c
2 . aD2 is slightly harder: we first need to
find the intersection of q · c and RD2(q):
1
2
+ q = qc
(c− 1)q = 1
2
q =
1
2(c− 1)
So the lower part of the shaded area of D2 is a line that passes through the points (0, 1) and
( 12(c−1) ,
c
2(c−1)). The line segment that connects the two is given by the equation 1 + q(2− c) hence
at q = 12 it is 2− c/2, therefore aD2 = 54 − 2 + c2 = c2 − 34 .
Setting aD1 = aD2 yields c =
7
4 with aD1 = aD2 =
1
8 . Therefore, for any auction that we decide
to run will have additive loss of 2a = 14 on one of the two distributions, and we need Ω(2
n/n)
samples to decide which distribution we are dealing with. 
Corollary A.2 For any  > 0, to obtain a (78 + )-approximation (multiplicative) to Myerson’s
auction, with constant probability you need Ω(2n/n) samples.
Proof: We can upper bound the revenue curve by the constant 2, to show that the optimal auction
cannot have expected revenue more than 2. Since we have additive loss of 1/4, the multiplicative
approximation ratio is at most 78 . 
23
